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SANS Stormcast Monday, February 23rd, 2026: Japanese Phishing; AI Agents Ignoring Instructions; Starkiller MFA Phishing

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Japanese Phishing; AI Agents Ignoring Instructions; Starkiller MFA Phishing
00:00

Japanese-Language Phishing Emails
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Japanese-Language%20Phishing%20Emails/32734

'God-Like' Attack Machines: AI Agents Ignore Security Policies
https://www.darkreading.com/application-security/ai-agents-ignore-security-policies

Starkiller: New Phishing Framework Proxies Real Login Pages to Bypass MFA
https://abnormal.ai/blog/starkiller-phishing-kit

Podcast Transcript

 Hello and welcome to the Monday, February 23rd, 2026
 edition of the SANS Internet Storm Center's
 Stormcast. My name is Johannes Ulrich, recording today from
 Jacksonville, Florida. And this episode is brought to you
 by the SANS.edu Graduate Certificate Program in
 Penetration Testing and Ethical Hacking. Brad on
 Friday published a diary talking about some Japanese
 phishing emails. Now Brad doesn't speak Japanese, he
 does not reside in Japan, but still for some reason got on a
 mailing list of a particular threat actor that's sending
 out phishing emails in Japanese. Now Brad is talking
 a little bit about why he believes that all of the
 emails that he received at part of these campaigns come
 from the same group, the same threat actor. But the real, I
 think the lesson here is that the threat actors, they are
 not just sending emails in English. And this can
 particularly be a problem for multinational companies where
 your normal business language is English. And as a result,
 often when you're talking about phishing, when you're
 doing phishing tests, you're sending these tests in
 English. A few years back, we had a sans.edu student who
 looked into, for example, how to figure out what languages
 are actually being used in your environment based on
 emails that are being sent, and then somewhat tailoring
 some of the phishing tests based on it. I know phishing
 testing and such is a controversial subject in
 itself, but if you're doing it, you may as well want to
 try to do it as well as possible. And I think part of
 this should be that you are looking at, well, phishing
 emails in different languages. Also, when you're looking at
 your spam and phishing filters, you have to make sure
 that they don't have similar biases and are going to
 capture these non-English phishing emails, which could
 be missed if, well, your phishing filter basically is
 only looking for English emails. And considers those as
 potential phishing emails. And the last couple weeks, we had
 a couple of incidents where security was breached by AI
 tools not following instructions, in particular
 when it comes to security guardrails that the AI was
 supposed to obey. I think what's happening here is very
 similar to what you have in humans, where humans often try
 to get work done and in the process ignore things like
 code phrases or not being supposed to use certain data
 or not supposed to be using certain tools. Well, as AI
 becomes more intelligent, well, it's adapting also to
 some of these behaviors that, of course, are often
 associated with intelligence. On the other hand, well, it's
 not quite that intelligent yet, so sometimes it doesn't
 make the right decision. There have been a number of these
 incidents and I'm going to link to an article by Robert
 Lemus on dark reading. He summarized some of this where,
 for example, and that was one that I almost included last
 week in the podcast, but didn't because that was just
 another story. But the Microsoft's co-pilot did
 apparently index some confidential emails, even
 though being told not to. There were other issues, like
 I mentioned, where AI agents made changes, even though they
 were told not to make any changes and the like. So
 definitely, this is a recurring problem. And in the
 end, the only way I believe that you're going to sort of
 safely use some of these tools is where you're actually
 preventing access by not providing them with the
 necessary credentials to, for example, make changes to your
 code, unless you actually want them to make changes to your
 code. There's also a story, and I haven't 100% verified it
 yet, but looks like it came from Amazon itself, where
 Amazon stated that they had a couple of outages that were
 caused by AI tools essentially overstepping their bounds and
 making changes they weren't supposed to make. Well, it
 wasn't the big Amazon outage, but some smaller sort of tools
 within the AWS ecosystem were down for multiple hours as a
 result. And going back to a phishing for another story,
 Starkiller. That is a new phishing framework that
 Abnormal did document in one of their blog posts. It's yet
 another improvement on a phishing framework that allows
 you to actually play machine in the middle attacks with
 multi-factor authentication interceptions. I think the
 real thing that I sort of try to keep through also, and I'm
 teaching about this in class and such, that not all multi
 -factor authentication schemes are the same. There are
 phishing resistant ones, and there are ones that are non
 -phishing resistant. The vast majority that's currently
 being implemented is not phishing resistant. If you're
 relying on some kind of one -time password or something
 like this, like the famous Google Authenticator, even
 some of the little bit more sophisticated varieties like
 Microsoft authentication with the code that you need to
 acknowledge. Well, pretty much anything like this, where the
 user decides whether or not they should enter a particular
 credential, whether that's a one-time password, whether
 that's acknowledging a number or whether that's a regular
 password, well, if the user is in charge and deciding what
 credentials to submit, then your authentication is not
 phishing resistant. So if you want to be phishing resistant,
 the machine needs to decide what credential to send. And
 that pretty much comes down to things like pass keys, other
 FIDO2 variants and such, that are somewhat phishing
 resistant. And that's really what you should try to
 implement these days. Well, and that's it for today. So
 thanks for listening. Thanks for liking. Thanks for
 subscribing to this podcast and talk to you again
 tomorrow. Bye.