Handler on Duty: Xavier Mertens
Threat Level: green
Podcast Detail
SANS Stormcast Friday, March 20th, 2026: Cowrie Strings; MSFT Intune Hardening; Unifi Network Update;
If you are not able to play the podcast using the player below: Use this direct link to the audio file: https://traffic.libsyn.com/securitypodcast/9858.mp3
My Next Class
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Orlando | Mar 29th - Apr 3rd 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Amsterdam | Apr 20th - Apr 25th 2026 |
Interesting Cowrie Strings
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Interesting+Message+Stored+in+Cowrie+Logs/32810
Microsoft Intune Hardening Advice
https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/intunecustomersuccess/best-practices-for-securing-microsoft-intune/4502117
https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/03/18/cisa-urges-endpoint-management-system-hardening-after-cyberattack-against-us-organization
Unifi Network Update
https://community.ui.com/releases/Security-Advisory-Bulletin-062-062/c29719c0-405e-4d4a-8f26-e343e99f931b
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Orlando | Mar 29th - Apr 3rd 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Amsterdam | Apr 20th - Apr 25th 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | San Diego | May 11th - May 16th 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Online | Arabian Standard Time | Jun 20th - Jun 25th 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Riyadh | Jun 20th - Jun 25th 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Washington | Jul 13th - Jul 18th 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Online | British Summer Time | Jul 27th - Aug 1st 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Las Vegas | Sep 21st - Sep 26th 2026 |
Podcast Transcript
Hello and welcome to the Friday, March 20th, 2026 edition of the SANS Internet Storm Center's Stormcast. My name is Johannes Ullrich, recording today from Jacksonville, Florida. And this episode is brought to you by the SANS.edu Graduate Certificate Program in Cyber Defense Operations. One of the questions we often get is whether or not any like global events are affecting what we are seeing in our logs. Now we have in the past often seen like disasters and such for example being used in scams. Guy had an interesting sort of event in his Cowrie honeypot that's a little bit related with what's happening now in Iran. Essentially a message that the attacker added to the command line here that was executed in the honeypot that just stays magic payload killer here or leave empty and then Iran bot was here. This is often kind of just used as a little indicator whether or not the commands are actually properly processed. Sometimes sort of strings like this are being also used to identify honeypots to see what is then actually being returned by the particular shell that they attempt to log into. In this case it wasn't anything remotely sophisticated just yet sort of another ssh brute forcing attack and sometimes attackers are really also just you know using these strings for notoriety to maybe be recognized or such. But yes not everything is sort of nation states if it does mention a nation as part of a string in a payload like this. Talking about Iran there was one significant breach that was caused by threat actors associated with Iran and that was against the medical supply company Stryker. Now I typically don't talk about breaches much unless there's sort of a lesson to be learned or something actionable coming out of it and that's what we have now Microsoft as well as CISA released guidelines how to better secure your Microsoft Intune account. So Microsoft Intune is a mobile device management console and you can use it to basically figure out you know what is installed on mobile devices in your organization but it also has the remote wipe capability in case for example of a physical loss of a device and that's what the attacker abused here. The attacker apparently did wipe something like 200,000 I think was the number I've seen devices associated with Stryker which of course is a catastrophic event for the company. Well there are a couple things that you can do in order to prevent this from happening to yourself. First of all I think one of the biggest things here is just to make sure there is no phishing happening so some phishing resistant authentication should happen here. Design your admin controls well so not every admin needs to be able to delete all 200,000 devices and then I have an interesting feature called multi-admin approval. Therefore, sensitive changes like wiping devices you need actually two administrators to come together and approve the event and that's certainly something you know that also adds some additional phishing resistance but also basically just prevents sort of for example a compromised workstation or something like this to be then abused to delete all of your devices. So if you're using any system like this and I think this does not just apply to Microsoft Intune but other mobile device management systems definitely take a look and make sure that you have these things properly configured. As far as Iran goes if this is really the only thing that's happening it's probably much less than some people were afraid of when it comes to various cyber attacks. And then we got an update from Ubiquiti for its unified network application. This update fixes two different vulnerabilities. The first one has a perfect 10 as far as the CVSS score goes. It's a path traversal vulnerability that does not require any authentication and could essentially allow an attacker to read arbitrary files which then may lead to actually compromising the system further. The second vulnerability is a no SQL injection vulnerability but it does require authentication. Updates are available for the unified network application. You typically run it on your unified gateway sometimes on distinct cloud keys or other devices like that. And then of course the usual advice don't expose these kind of admin interfaces to the public and make sure they're only accessible from the internal network preferably from specific admin workstations or subnets. Well that's it for today and just a quick note this Saturday I'll be happy to participate in the sans.edu commencement so ahead of it congratulations to all of our graduates this year. And that's it for today thanks for listening thanks for liking thanks for commenting and talk to you again on Monday bye.





