Handler on Duty: Guy Bruneau
Threat Level: green
Podcast Detail
SANS Stormcast Thursday, February 19th, 2026: Malware Image Resuse; Dell RecoveryPoint; Admin Center Vuln; DNS-PERSIST-01
If you are not able to play the podcast using the player below: Use this direct link to the audio file: https://traffic.libsyn.com/securitypodcast/9816.mp3
My Next Class
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Orlando | Mar 29th - Apr 3rd 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Amsterdam | Apr 20th - Apr 25th 2026 |
Tracking Malware Campaigns With Reused Material
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Tracking%20Malware%20Campaigns%20With%20Reused%20Material/32726
From BRICKSTORM to GRIMBOLT: UNC6201 Exploiting a Dell RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines Zero-Day
https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc6201-exploiting-dell-recoverpoint-zero-day
Windows Admin Center Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability CVE-2026-26119
https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-26119
DNS-PERSIST-01: A New Model for DNS-based Challenge Validation
https://letsencrypt.org/2026/02/18/dns-persist-01.html
Defending Web Apps
https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-courses/application-security-securing-web-apps-api-microservices
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Orlando | Mar 29th - Apr 3rd 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Amsterdam | Apr 20th - Apr 25th 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | San Diego | May 11th - May 16th 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Online | Arabian Standard Time | Jun 20th - Jun 25th 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Riyadh | Jun 20th - Jun 25th 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Washington | Jul 13th - Jul 18th 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Online | British Summer Time | Jul 27th - Aug 1st 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Las Vegas | Sep 21st - Sep 26th 2026 |
Podcast Transcript
Hello and welcome to the Thursday, February 19th, 2026 edition of the SANS Internet Storm Center's Stormcast. My name is Johannes Ullrich, recording today from Jacksonville, Florida. And this episode is brought to you by the SANS.edu Graduate Certificate Program in Industrial Control System Security. Well, Xavier continues to be on a roll this week with yet another piece of malware to analyze. And in this case, it's actually a nice example on how to combine different pieces of malware with certain actors. A week or so ago, Xavier did already talk about a piece of malware that used an MSI wallpaper as part of its payload. Now, in that particular case, it was really just used sort of to basically have an image to attach a code to. So the image itself, that wallpaper could have been any other image. But what Xavier found is that there's other malware that uses exactly the same image, suggesting that it was created by the same actor. Also uses some other similar techniques and such as the malware that Xavier covered in the past. And overall, Xavier found a few hundred of pieces of submissions to VirusTotal that included this image, not all of them being labeled as malicious. And that's where it gets interesting whether or not you should add something benign like this image to some form of signature. Maybe it's interesting to sort of highlight certain samples and maybe look at them in more detail or include it as part of signature. Of course, not necessarily as the only signature to look for malicious activity. And yesterday, Dell released an update for Recovery Point for Virtual Machines. This update is fixing a fixed credential vulnerability. So nothing really all too special here, just your usual backdoor and enterprise software. But what makes it sort of even more interesting is that Google published a blog post stating that they have seen exploitation of this particular vulnerability for a few months now. So if you do have any exposed Dell Recovery Point for Virtual Machines systems out there, well, you definitely want to take a look. This system is Tomcat based, so attackers will typically then add web shells to it. Another interesting thing that Google has observed is that in order to evade detection, the attacker is setting up new network interfaces on the virtual machine and using that then to communicate and also do some lateral movement inside the network. Also some interesting IP tables rules that are being added to the system in order to sort of provide simple semi -authenticated access to the vulnerable system for an attacker even after the vulnerability should be patched. So definitely take a look at the system if you have them. Make sure they're not already compromised. So don't just blindly patch and move on. Another little bit odd security update from Microsoft. This one sort of came out of order. It's for Windows Admin Center and fixes an elevation of privilege vulnerability. Apparently not yet exploited, but Microsoft does suggest that exploitation of this vulnerability would be likely. Now elevation of privileges here doesn't mean necessarily that you get access to like system or administrator, but you get access to whatever user is executing the application. And I believe they're referring here to the Windows Admin Center application. So updated patch is available, but not 100% sure why this was sort of released as a special patch. And let's encrypt is going to introduce a new method in order to update your certificates. This one is interesting. It's DNS space. Now you may be familiar with DNS01. That's the method that I personally prefer. You basically publish a specific DNS record and well then you use that to authenticate that you have control over the domain. This is only like short-lived. Each time you need a new certificate, you must again update that DNS record. And of course that leads often to complications, trying to keep your DNS zone updated and also distributing necessary API key material that you may need in order to keep everything up to date. The Certificate Authority Browser Forum and other standard bodies like IETF have now published a variation of this method, DNSpersist01. This method does allow you to publish a specific DNS record and it can then be used for long-term authentication in order to verify that you control the domain. It's linked to the particular account that you have set up with Let's Encrypt or whatever sort of authority you're using. This is not Let's Encrypt specific, but as far as I know, Let's Encrypt is the first one to actually use this method. So you don't have to constantly update your DNS zone. Now you may and as optional add some expiration date to the record. So that way it will only be valid for a certain limited time. You can also allow or not allow wildcard certificates to be issued based on that authentication. So that's supposed to make things a lot simpler. And remember, we are moving towards shorter and shorter certificate lifetimes. In particular, Let's Encrypt is pushing that fairly aggressively. So by reducing some of the friction and also fragility of the update process, things will probably become in the end more secure. Well, that's it for today. Thanks for liking. Thanks for recommending this podcast and sharing it on social media. And by the way, if you're interested still in the Orlando event where I'll be teaching our defending web application class, there is now a special where you actually get the free on demand version. So if you don't like me, you'll have then also Jason Lamb teach you the material as part of the online on demand version of the material that you'll get for free. So two instructor, one price. And that's it for today. Talk to you again tomorrow. Bye.





