Handler on Duty: Johannes Ullrich
Threat Level: green
Podcast Detail
SANS Stormcast Monday, August 11th, 2025: Fake Tesla Preorders; Bad USB Cameras; Win-DoS Epidemic
If you are not able to play the podcast using the player below: Use this direct link to the audio file: https://traffic.libsyn.com/securitypodcast/9564.mp3
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Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Las Vegas | Sep 22nd - Sep 27th 2025 |
Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Denver | Oct 4th - Oct 9th 2025 |
Google Paid Ads for Fake Tesla Websites
Someone is setting up fake Tesla lookalike websites that attempt to collect credit card data from unsuspecting users trying to preorder Tesla products.
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Google%20Paid%20Ads%20for%20Fake%20Tesla%20Websites/32186
Compromising USB Devices for Persistent Stealthy Access
USB devices, like Linux-based web cams, can be compromised to emulate malicious USB devices like keyboards that inject malicious commands.
https://eclypsium.com/blog/badcam-now-weaponizing-linux-webcams/
Win-DoS Epidemic: A crash course in abusing RPC for Win-DoS & Win-DDoS
Internet-exposed DCs can be used in very powerful DoS attacks.
https://defcon.org/html/defcon-33/dc-33-speakers.html#content_60389
Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Las Vegas | Sep 22nd - Sep 27th 2025 |
Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Denver | Oct 4th - Oct 9th 2025 |
Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Dallas | Dec 1st - Dec 6th 2025 |
Podcast Transcript
Hello and welcome to the Monday, August 11th, 2025 edition of the SANS Internet Storm Center's Stormcast. My name is Johannes Ullrich, recording today from Jacksonville, Florida. And this episode is brought to you by the SANS.edu Graduate Certificate Program in Purple Team Operations. This weekend's diary was about an, at least new to me, scam targeting, well, Tesla users or Tesla enthusiasts trying to pre-order some Tesla products, in particular the Tesla Optimus robot. If you're searching for Tesla Optimus pre-orders on Google, you're being confronted with a number of, well, links that are sponsored, so they're paid for, but they're not paid for by Tesla. If you're clicking on any of these links, you are ending up on a lookalike site that looks like a little bit older design of the Tesla website, but the latest domain name being used here and that has been changing over the last few days is offers-tesla .com. And now you're able here to pre-order some yet unreleased products, for example, the Optimus robot, which of course has been sort of heavily featured in the news, and it will happily allow you to pay for this robot using your credit card. I went through the checkout process here and using just a fake credit card number, and it let me go through so it didn't attempt to charge the number because that would have failed. It may use those numbers later to maybe, you know, resell them, use them on other websites. That's not really clear what the real endgame here is of this particular scam, but likely thereafter stealing the credit card data. There's also no login on the page, unlike the real Tesla page. So when you come back later, well, you're unlikely to be able to check the status of your order, so it may take a while for the user to realize that they have been scammed. Now, during the checkout process, it does offer you to register. I wasn't able at the time to complete it because spam filters, as I found out later, ate the sort of confirmation email that is being sent back. But either way, even if you register on this particular site, well, like I said, there is no real spot here to log in. Similarly, if you're trying to pre-order any of the other products, like any of the Tesla cars, you will be allowed to go through the process. But, well, it definitely doesn't go to Tesla. It just basically takes a credit card number and not sure, again, you know what they'll do with the number, but the money is very unlikely going to go to Tesla. These sites have been rotating. They stay up for a couple of days. So I assume that at one point Tesla, someone else, is actually then shutting them down. But they keep setting up new sites. The naming scheme is always some prefix like offers, pre-order, or the like dash, tesla.com. And then we got a couple of quick items from DEFCON, which of course happened this weekend. First one here, researchers from Eclypsium demonstrated what they call a BadCam attack. Now, what this really is all about is that if you do have any kind of USB device, an attacker is able to update the firmware on that USB device. The attacker would have to first trick the victim into executing code, but then it gains a nice persistent access to the system just by basically updating the firmware of the USB device. They demonstrate that using webcams, running Linux. I can imagine that this will work with any other USB device that has easily updatable firmware. So first you compromise the system. Then you discover what kind of peripherals are connected. You update the firmware of one of these peripherals. And then you can basically turn this particular peripheral, like the webcam in this case, into a USB keyboard and inject keystrokes executing additional malicious code. And again, this is probably more sort of a persistent technique where once you compromise the system, you put some kind of code into that webcam that will continuously reinstall, for example, a backdoor after it was removed. With these USB devices being out of scope for any kind of endpoint protection, that makes it a real neat way to sort of hide malicious code. And then another interesting DEF CON talk was from Shahak Morag. I hope I pronounced the name correctly, but it was about an interesting denial of service attack that in particular affects domain controllers that are exposed to the internet, which I don't think is something you really should do. And I think that's another reason why you shouldn't do this. The problem here is RPC and how this can easily be abused for denial of service. RPC is required for a domain controller. And the basic underlying trick here is that the attacker is turning your domain controller via RPC into an LDAP client and then is sending it a flood of LDAP referral URLs that are all pointing the same IP address. And if you're using this, your domain controller will now flood this other system with these LDAP queries. And that leads to a denial of service attack. Of course, some rate limiting on the receiving end may help here. This is really sort of more CPU memory exhaustion attack. So it's not just plain flooding it with packets, not just volumetric the attack, but still don't expose your domain controllers. I think that's the number one lesson to take away from this here. Well, and that's it for today. Thanks for listening. Thanks for liking and recommending this podcast and for leaving good podcast reviews. If I missed anything, if I missed a story, if I missed something from DEF CON, Black Hat or such, let me know. And by the way, I never mind if like an author or a researcher is telling me about something they just published. I don't like marketing people doing it, but researchers, if that was your work, you want to get to the world. Well, that's what research is all about to disseminate your results. So let me know. And that's it for today. Thanks and talk to you again tomorrow. Bye.