Handler on Duty: Johannes Ullrich
Threat Level: green
Podcast Detail
SANS Stormcast Wednesday, January 28th, 2026: Romance Scams; DoS Vuln in React Server Components; OpenSSL Patch; Kubernetes Priv Confusion
If you are not able to play the podcast using the player below: Use this direct link to the audio file: https://traffic.libsyn.com/securitypodcast/9784.mp3
Romance Scams; DoS Vuln in React Server Components; OpenSSL Patch; Kubernetes Priv Confusion
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| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Orlando | Mar 29th - Apr 3rd 2026 |
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Initial Stages of Romance Scams [Guest Diary]
Romance scams often start with random text messages that appear to be “misrouted”. This guest diary by Faris Azhari is following some of the initial stages of such a scam.
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Initial%20Stages%20of%20Romance%20Scams%20%5BGuest%20Diary%5D/32650
Denial of Service Vulnerabilities in React Server Components
Another folowup fix for the severe React vulnerability from last year, but now only fixing a DoS condition.
https://github.com/facebook/react/security/advisories/GHSA-83fc-fqcc-2hmg
OpenSSL Updates
OpenSSL released its monthly updates, fixing a potential RCE.
https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/
Kubernetes Remote Code Execution Via Nodes/Proxy GET Permission
Many Kubernetes Helm Charts are vulnerable to possible remote code executions due to unclear defined access controls.
https://grahamhelton.com/blog/nodes-proxy-rce
Discussion
The Shibboleth vulnerability is quite interesting. In their example, the SAML signature covers the entire and they've made modifications to it (the changes to the uid) that should cause the signature to fail validation. This vulnerability speaks to larger architectural issues with Shibboleth. Obviously the signature validation is happening on a DIFFERENT document (the inline DTD defs are resolved and replaced) than the attribute extraction code works on (the inline DTD variables are not replaced). This is a HUGE no no and leads to the confused deputy issues that caused the vulnerability. I would bet other SP SAML parsing code is making similar mistakes.
Posted by Anonymous on Tue Jan 16 2018, 16:54
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