Handler on Duty: Guy Bruneau
Threat Level: green
Podcast Detail
SANS Stormcast Thursday, January 15th, 2026: Luma Streal Repeat Infection; ServiceNow Broken Auth; Starlink/GPS Jamming
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Infection repeatedly adds scheduled tasks and increases traffic to the same C2 domain
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Infection%20repeatedly%20adds%20scheduled%20tasks%20and%20increases%20traffic%20to%20the%20same%20C2%20domain/32628
BodySnatcher (CVE-2025-12420): A Broken Authentication and Agentic Hijacking Vulnerability in ServiceNow
https://appomni.com/ao-labs/bodysnatcher-agentic-ai-security-vulnerability-in-servicenow/
Starlink Terminal GPS Spoofing/Jamming Detection in Iran
https://github.com/narimangharib/starlink-iran-gps-spoofing/blob/main/starlink-iran.md
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Podcast Transcript
Hello and welcome to the Thursday, January 15, 2026 edition of the SANS Internet Storm Center's Stormcast. My name is Johannes Ullrich, recording today from Jacksonville, Florida. And this episode is brought to you by the SANS.edu graduate certificate program in Incident Response. In Diaries today we got a malware write -up by Brad. Brad is writing about a recent version of Luma Steeler. Luma Steeler as the name implies is an info stealer. Now in this particular case it will exfiltrate your data and then it will download an additional URL from Pastebin with instructions on what to do next. At this point the odd new behavior here of this variety of Luma Steeler is that it adds a scheduled task to keep repeatedly doing this. But then whenever it downloads the next binary or whatever it's going to load on your system well it adds another scheduled task. So these scheduled tasks keep piling up. Apparently they are scheduled every 30 minutes and Brad observed systems running up to 30 or so off these scheduled tasks meaning every minute at that point a new variety of malware is being downloaded and executed which of course should make the infection more noisy. But note that all of this happens after the bulk of the data exfiltration already happened. So at this point I think the attacker is less worried about being discovered and probably is more attempting to scrape any kind of additional information from the system that was initially missed. It's also possible that they're then sort of handing on the system to some other group that installs whatever malware they prefer, ransomware or whatever. And we have yet another interesting agentic AI vulnerability. In this case it's again ServiceNow. They have been in the news in the past with some vulnerabilities in their integrations. But this is really not so much an AI problem. It's really sort of one of your very basic authentication issues and particular the reuse of credentials. So the way the main part of the vulnerability here works, a lot of parts to it, but this is sort of the root cause of this issue is that the ServiceNow as part of its virtual agent did ship all virtual agents, basically all integrations, all customers that used it, got the same credentials. And this fixed credential was really all that was needed in order to authenticate. Now once of course an attacker knows that credential, well they're able to authenticate then as any user that has this particular application enabled. And since it was one of those default applications and also a very logic application to enable for ServiceNow. After all, it's sort of a help desk application. So having an automatic help desk agent makes a lot of sense here. Well, that basically then opened a lot of installations to this vulnerability. Now there are a couple more parts to it, how to exact and exploit it once you get access, once you sort of learn all of the UIDs and such being required in order to exploit this flaw. But still remember, even though it's AI, we are still dealing with very basic simple authentication vulnerabilities in this case. This last week there were a lot of news stories about Starlink terminals in Iran getting jammed and it wasn't really clear how this worked. Now thanks to a blog post by Noriman Garib, we now have some evidence as to what was going on there. What Noriman did is look at some debug logs from affected Starlink terminals and the common denominator was problems with GPS, which also makes some sense. Starlink terminals need to know their location in order to be able to direct themselves at the correct satellites in the sky. So they have similar to what GPS does too, they have tables as to which satellite is in what location at what time and then they calculate the angle to direct the antenna at a particular time based on their own location. Now the problem here was that apparently GPS was jammed and that's nothing really new. That has happened a lot in the last few years. The Starlink signal itself apparently wasn't actually here affected. It was just that the space station, not knowing where it exactly is, wasn't able to accurately point to the right satellites. Now there is actually sort of a failover mode here in these Starlink terminals if they recognize that GPS isn't working correctly. This failover mode was engaged in these cases but apparently without GPS just using Starlink satellite signals to position itself. Well that apparently wasn't accurate enough. So there's a potential fix here for the problem by improving the location via Starlink's own satellites. Of course the vast number of these satellites may make them more difficult than to interfere with and that was actually a proposal that was pointed out by SpaceX and Starlink in the past that they could use their satellites as an alternative to GPS. Well and that's it for today. Thanks for listening. Thanks for liking and subscribing to this podcast. Remember we also still have the contest going on if you find any mistakes in this podcast or have any other comments. You qualify for a free sticker and that's it for today. Talk to you again tomorrow. Bye.






Starlink jamming portion
“Space Station”