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Microsoft Word document with malicious macro pushes IcedID (Bokbot)

Published: 2020-05-20
Last Updated: 2020-05-20 00:10:03 UTC
by Brad Duncan (Version: 1)
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Introduction

Every so often, I run across a sample of IcedID, also known as Bokbot.  The infection characteristics have changed a little since my previous diary about IcedID.  An in-depth write-up has already been published by IBM Security Intelligence about recent changes in IcedID this year, so today's diary is a quick review from a recent infection in my lab on Tuesday 2020-05-19.

The chain of events for this infection:

  • Microsoft Office document, either a Word document or Excel spreadsheet, likely sent through malspam
  • Open document and enable macros
  • Word doc drops and runs initial EXE
  • HTTPS traffic to non-malicious URLs
  • HTTPS traffic to .xyz domain
  • PNG file with encoded data used to create follow-up IcedID EXE
  • Follow-up IcedID EXE made persistent through scheduled task
  • HTTPS post-infection traffic caused by IcedID (.club and .top TLDs)

The Word document


Shown above:  Screenshot of a Word document with malicious macros for IcedID.

Artifacts from an infected Windows host

The following are screenshots from reviewing artifacts from an infected Windows host in my lab.


Shown above:  The initial EXE dropped after enabling macros on the Word document.


Shown above:  Additional artifacts after the initial EXE was dropped. This includes the follow-up EXE for IcedID.


Shown above:  The follow-up EXE for IcedID persistent on an infected Windows host.


Shown above: Scheduled task to keep the IcedID infection persistent.


Shown above: Another artifact created after the IcedID infection became persistent.

Infection traffic


Shown above:  Traffic from the infection filtered in Wireshark.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Non-malicious traffic caused by the initial IcedID binary during this infection:

  • port 443 - support.apple.com - HTTPS traffic
  • port 443 - www.intel.com - HTTPS traffic
  • port 443 - help.twitter.com - HTTPS traffic
  • port 443 - support.microsoft.com - HTTPS traffic
  • port 443 - support.oracle.com - HTTPS traffic
  • port 443 - www.oracle.com - HTTPS traffic

Malicious traffic during this IcedID infection:

  • 86.106.20[.]175 port 443 - connuwedro[.]xyz - HTTPS traffic
  • 31.24.224[.]12 port 443 - cucumberz99[.]club - HTTPS traffic
  • 31.24.224[.]12 port 443 - pimidorro22[.]top - HTTPS traffic
  • 31.24.224[.]12 port 443 - gotothe5[.]club - HTTPS traffic

Files recovered from an infected Windows host:

SHA256 hash:  822a8e3dfa14cd7aaac749dc0515c35cf20632717e191568ba5daf137db7ec17

  • File size:  127,278 bytes
  • File name:  FMLAINSTRUCTIONS.doc
  • File description:  Word doc (DOCX file) with macro for IcedID (Bokbot)

SHA256 hash:  ee9fd78107cdcaffc274cf2484d6c74c56c7f3be39b1896894d9525506118d1e

  • File size:  108,032 bytes
  • File location:  C:\1\Whole\PFSDNSKDF.EXE
  • File description:  Initial EXE for IcedID infection dropped after enabling Word macros

SHA256 hash:  d40566808aead4fecec53813d38df4fbe26958281a529baf5b6689f0163d613f

  • File size:  109,895 bytes
  • File location:  C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\Temp\~530644480.tmp
  • File type:  PNG image data, 525 x 539, 8-bit/color RGB, non-interlaced
  • File description:  PNG image containing encoded data for follow-up IcedID executable

SHA256 hash:  c35dd2a034376c5f0f22f0e708dc773af8ee5baf83e2a4749f6f9d374338cd8e

  • File size:  105,472 bytes
  • File location:  C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\Temp\~5157171.exe
  • File location:  C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Roaming\{A64BACC9-7079-26A0-9625-645E78074A96}\[username]\Ixoyhoka2.exe
  • File description:  IcedID executable extracted from the above PNG and made persistent on the infected Windows host

SHA256 hash:  45520a22cdf580f091ae46c45be318c3bb4d3e41d161ba8326a2e29f30c025d4

  • File size:  667,077 bytes
  • File location:  C:\Users\[username]\AppData\Local\ilbekaac2\{1EA129C9-3B27-EA75-47E0-B55E92D185DD}\tiagac3.png
  • File description:  Artifact dropped during IcedID infection, probably contains encoded data
  • File type:  PNG image data, 643 x 283, 8-bit/color RGB, non-interlaced

Final words

Word documents pushing IcedID reliably generate infections on vulnerable hosts in my lab environment.  However, Windows 10 computers that are fully patched, up-to-date, and following best security practices are not likely to get infected.

Email examples, malware samples, and a pcap from an infected Windows host used in today's diary can be found here.

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Brad Duncan
brad [at] malware-traffic-analysis.net

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