ISC Stormcast For Tuesday, July 3rd 2018 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=6064

Hello Peppa! - PHP Scans

Published: 2018-07-02
Last Updated: 2018-07-02 12:47:57 UTC
by Guy Bruneau (Version: 1)
6 comment(s)

In the last few days (27 June on), my honeypot collected from various sources the same eight PHP POST to these scripts. Here are the eight scripts it attempts to post to:

20180629-132704: 192.168.25.2:80-47.96.42.91:3216 data "POST /wuwu11.php HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 192.168.96.183:80\r\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\r\nConnection: Close\r\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\nContent-Length: 45\r\n\r\nh=die('Hello, Peppa!'.(string)(111111111*9));"
20180629-132704: 192.168.25.2:80-47.96.42.91:3255 data "POST /xw.php HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 192.168.96.183:80\r\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\r\nConnection: Close\r\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\nContent-Length: 45\r\n\r\nh=die('Hello, Peppa!'.(string)(111111111*9));"
20180629-132705: 192.168.25.2:80-47.96.42.91:3533 data "POST /xx.php HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 192.168.96.183:80\r\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\r\nConnection: Close\r\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\nContent-Length: 47\r\n\r\naxa=die('Hello, Peppa!'.(string)(111111111*9));"
20180629-132705: 192.168.25.2:80-47.96.42.91:3609 data "POST /s.php HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 192.168.96.183:80\r\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\r\nConnection: Close\r\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\nContent-Length: 48\r\n\r\nleng=die('Hello, Peppa!'.(string)(111111111*9));"
20180629-132706: 192.168.25.2:80-47.96.42.91:3625 data "POST /w.php HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 192.168.96.183:80\r\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\r\nConnection: Close\r\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\nContent-Length: 48\r\n\r\nleng=die('Hello, Peppa!'.(string)(111111111*9));"
20180629-132706: 192.168.25.2:80-47.96.42.91:3707 data "POST /db.init.php HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 192.168.96.183:80\r\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\r\nConnection: Close\r\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\nContent-Length: 48\r\n\r\neval=die('Hello, Peppa!'.(string)(111111111*9));"
20180629-132707: 192.168.25.2:80-47.96.42.91:3733 data "POST /db_session.init.php HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 192.168.96.183:80\r\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\r\nConnection: Close\r\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\nContent-Length: 48\r\n\r\neval=die('Hello, Peppa!'.(string)(111111111*9));"
20180629-132707: 192.168.25.2:80-47.96.42.91:3779 data "POST /sheep.php HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 192.168.96.183:80\r\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\r\nConnection: Close\r\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\r\nContent-Length: 44\r\n\r\nm=die('Hello, Peppa!'.(string)(111111111*9))"


What is strange about these post, the test string is always the same [..]=die('Hello, Peppa!'.(string)(111111111*9))"

Have you seen any of these in your logs?

[1] http://www.honeypots.tk/details?id=W5CKOYAY8PQ3KGAC

-----------
Guy Bruneau IPSS Inc.
Twitter: GuyBruneau
gbruneau at isc dot sans dot edu

Keywords: PHP Scans Testing
6 comment(s)
VMware ESXi, Workstation, and Fusion address multiple out-of-bounds read vulnerabilities https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2018-0016.html
ISC Stormcast For Monday, July 2nd 2018 https://isc.sans.edu/podcastdetail.html?id=6062

Comments

What's this all about ..?
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Enter comment here... a fake TeamViewer page, and that page led to a different type of malware. This week's infection involved a downloaded JavaScript (.js) file that led to Microsoft Installer packages (.msi files) containing other script that used free or open source programs.
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Enter corthrthmment here...

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