Handler on Duty: Xavier Mertens
Threat Level: green
Podcast Detail
SANS Stormcast Friday, January 23rd, 2026: Scanning AI Code; FortiGate Update; ISC BIND DoS; Trivial SmaterMail Vulnerability
If you are not able to play the podcast using the player below: Use this direct link to the audio file: https://traffic.libsyn.com/securitypodcast/9778.mp3
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Is AI-Generated Code Secure?
Xavier used the free static code analysis tool Bandit to review code he wrote with heavy AI support.
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Is%20AI-Generated%20Code%20Secure%3F/32648
Malicious Configuration Changes On Fortinet FortiGate Devices via SSO Accounts
Arctic Wolf summarized some of the attacks it is seeing against FortiGate devices via the insufficiently patched SSL vulnerability.
https://arcticwolf.com/resources/blog/arctic-wolf-observes-malicious-configuration-changes-fortinet-fortigate-devices-via-sso-accounts/
ISC BIND DoS vulnerability in Drone ID Records
HHIT and BRID records, which are used as part of Drone ID, can be used to crash named if their length is 3 bytes.
https://marlink.com/resources/knowledge-hub/isc-bind-vulnerability-discovered-and-disclosed-by-marlink-cyber/
SmarterTools SmarterMail Password Reset Vulnerability
SmarterTools recently patched a trivial vulnerability in SmarterMail that would allow anybody without authentication to reset administrator passwords.
https://labs.watchtowr.com/attackers-with-decompilers-strike-again-smartertools-smartermail-wt-2026-0001-auth-bypass/
Discussion
The Shibboleth vulnerability is quite interesting. In their example, the SAML signature covers the entire and they've made modifications to it (the changes to the uid) that should cause the signature to fail validation. This vulnerability speaks to larger architectural issues with Shibboleth. Obviously the signature validation is happening on a DIFFERENT document (the inline DTD defs are resolved and replaced) than the attribute extraction code works on (the inline DTD variables are not replaced). This is a HUGE no no and leads to the confused deputy issues that caused the vulnerability. I would bet other SP SAML parsing code is making similar mistakes.
Posted by Anonymous on Tue Jan 16 2018, 16:54
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