Handler on Duty: Xavier Mertens
Threat Level: green
Podcast Detail
SANS Stormcast Tuesday, January 20th, 2026: Scans Against LLMs; NTLM Rainbow Table; OOB MSFT Patch
If you are not able to play the podcast using the player below: Use this direct link to the audio file: https://traffic.libsyn.com/securitypodcast/9772.mp3
My Next Class
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Orlando | Mar 29th - Apr 3rd 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Amsterdam | Apr 20th - Apr 25th 2026 |
"How many states are there in the United States?"
Attackers are actively scanning for LLMs, fingerprinting them using the query “How many states are there in the United States?”.
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/%22How%20many%20states%20are%20there%20in%20the%20United%20States%3F%22/32618
Closing the Door on Net-NTLMv1: Releasing Rainbow Tables to Accelerate Protocol Deprecation
Mandiant is publicly releasing a comprehensive dataset of Net-NTLMv1 rainbow tables to underscore the urgency of migrating away from this outdated protocol.
https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/net-ntlmv1-deprecation-rainbow-tables
Out-of-band update to address issues observed with the January 2026 Windows security update
Microsoft has identified issues upon installing the January 2026 Windows security update. To address these issues, an out-of-band (OOB) update was released today, January 17, 2026
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/release-health/windows-message-center
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Orlando | Mar 29th - Apr 3rd 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Amsterdam | Apr 20th - Apr 25th 2026 |
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| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Online | Arabian Standard Time | Jun 20th - Jun 25th 2026 |
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Podcast Transcript
Hello and welcome to the Tuesday January 20, 2026 edition of the SANS Internet Storm Center's Stormcast. My name is Johannes Ullrich and today I'm recording from Jacksonville, Florida. And this episode is brought to you by the SANS.edu graduate certificate program in cybersecurity leadership. And the Didier's Honeypot observed an attacker hunting for large language models. More and more companies and also individuals are running their internal large language models and well some of them are exposing them to the internet. And this is what attackers are after. A couple reasons for that. First of all of course they could just use those models instead of the public and potentially more costly ones in order to run their queries. They could also possibly then exploit additional weaknesses in it. In particular if an individual or a company did add their own sort of internal knowledge base to the large language model they may be able to enumerate that and then figure out exactly you know what kind of secrets or so may be stored in that particular model. So a couple of possibilities here. We don't exactly know what there are after there are a couple other reports as well of people finding these scans in their logs. But yeah you probably don't want to expose these models to the public without any odd occasion. That's really just setting yourself up for at least a fairly costly compute bill. And Mandy and the part of Google of course now did release a rainbow table of possible net NTLM version 1 hashes. Now this is nothing really sort of super groundbreaking or such. We all know that NTLM version 1 with the single desks and MD4 hashing is pretty much flawed. But what they're trying to push here is that there's still organizations out there that are not sort of aggressively removing this from their authentication portfolio. So they want to give a penetration testers a tool to easily demonstrate that these particular authentication mechanisms are flawed and that even complex passwords that may be used here are not protecting anybody. They're stating that it will take you about 600 dollars worth of resources to host this rainbow table. I couldn't really find a good reference as to how big it is. Now I took a look at the Google Cloud storage. We can download them but it even didn't really sort of easily state a total size. I'm not sure if I just didn't look the right spot here. I'm not that familiar with Google Cloud. But so the 600 dollars may be just for storage which of course given current hard disk prices may be more expensive today than when they released this data. Either way it's fairly obtainable this data and should take about 12 hours they say to break any NTLM hash that you may run into. And they also outline how to obtain those hashes, what the different tools are that you have available. And then most importantly they're also stating and referencing various resources that help you move away from NTLM. And Microsoft this weekend took the well somewhat unusual step to release an out-of-band update on the weekend that did not fix a security flaw. Instead it fixed a problem introduced by last Tuesday patch Tuesday. And there are two issues that are being addressed here. One is where you had problems setting up RDP connections and a second one where some systems wouldn't shut down or hibernate. So if you ran into these problems in particular with a Windows 11 but the RDP issue apparently also affects some versions of Windows 10, Windows Server 2025, then you may want to make sure that you apply this update. And Lihat Eliao with Migo did document the interesting vulnerability in Google's calendar and how it works with Google's Gemini AI tools. The problem here is that NetHacker may send you a calendar invite. That calendar invite will include instructions for Gemini to summarize not just this meeting but also future meetings and exfiltrate the summary by essentially setting up a new calendar invite with the summary as part of the payload of this calendar invite. A pretty interesting exploit the way it sort of skirts some of the countermeasures that Gemini has put in place for this type of attack. And yet again another example how sort of blindly trusting these AI tools can easily get you into trouble. This flaw as far as I know and I've read hadn't been exploited yet but it's actually sort of in hindsight at least a reasonable straightforward flaw that probably also exists in numerous similar tools from other vendors. Well and this is it for today so thanks for listening and thanks for liking thanks for subscribing to this podcast and talk to you again tomorrow. Bye!





