Handler on Duty: Xavier Mertens
Threat Level: green
Podcast Detail
SANS Stormcast Monday, February 16th, 2026: Graph Generator; nslookup and clickfix; Chrome 0-Day; TURN Threats
If you are not able to play the podcast using the player below: Use this direct link to the audio file: https://traffic.libsyn.com/securitypodcast/9810.mp3
My Next Class
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Orlando | Mar 29th - Apr 3rd 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Amsterdam | Apr 20th - Apr 25th 2026 |
AI-Powered Knowledge Graph Generator & APTs
https://isc.sans.edu/diary/AI-Powered%20Knowledge%20Graph%20Generator%20%26%20APTs/32712
nslookup and ClickFix
https://x.com/MsftSecIntel/status/2022456612120629742
Google Chrome 0-Day Patch
https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/02/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_13.html
TURN Security Threats
https://www.enablesecurity.com/blog/turn-server-security-threats/
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Orlando | Mar 29th - Apr 3rd 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Amsterdam | Apr 20th - Apr 25th 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | San Diego | May 11th - May 16th 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Online | Arabian Standard Time | Jun 20th - Jun 25th 2026 |
| Network Monitoring and Threat Detection In-Depth | Riyadh | Jun 20th - Jun 25th 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Washington | Jul 13th - Jul 18th 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Online | British Summer Time | Jul 27th - Aug 1st 2026 |
| Application Security: Securing Web Apps, APIs, and Microservices | Las Vegas | Sep 21st - Sep 26th 2026 |
Podcast Transcript
Hello and welcome to the Monday, February 16th, 2026 edition of the SANS, Internet Storm Sonners Stormcast. My name is Johannes Ullrich and today I'm recording from Jacksonville, Florida. and this episode is brought to you by the SANS.edu Graduate Certificate Program in Cyber Defense Operations. In diaries we had one by Russ McRee from Friday about graph generators and APTs and how to automate creating these graphs with AI. There's a relatively new tool by Robert McDermott that Russ used for this diary and it also solves a couple different problems. First of all, often when you're looking at sort of threat intelligence, it comes in unstructured forms. Yes, there are probably more standards we need, but quite often you have articles and such that do describe particular threat. They may mention indicators of compromise and such. They may mention IP addresses, host names, and then also like what these systems are, who they belong to. And where this gets then really powerful is where this tool not only extracts these indicators, but it also then creates graphs displaying the relationship between them. I can see this in particular useful for the largest of aggregations of reports to sort of find a common sources of attacks, but also attack attribution. This may be helpful if you're into this kind of things. So certainly interesting tool and works here as Russ describes on commodity hardware. You don't need anything sort of special AI, but relatively modest, my opinion, laptop does work to create these graphs rather quickly. And Microsoft's threat intelligence team published a quick social media post about a new variety of the famous click fix attack that they're seeing. So click fix, the victim is being tricked into copy pasting a string from what looks like captcha into a command prompt and executing them. Now, a lot of defensive techniques then focus on sort of these living of the land binaries that are being executed here. What's sort of different here is that they're actually then retrieving the next level PowerShell script via NS lookup. And also the NS lookup kind of is a little bit tricky here. So the NS lookup is for example.com, which of course is the test domain and commonly considered harmless, but they're sending the request to a custom DNS server that will then return a CNAME, basically another host name. And that host name is the PowerShell script that's then being executed. Quite often when you're looking for DNS anomalies, you're looking basically for odd host names that people are looking up. And in this case, it will really just be initially at least the example.com. The odd CNAME coming back would certainly be a tip off then. And then of course, maybe if you're seeing any lookups then for the A record for that particular PowerShell script, that would certainly trigger some alerts. Also because the name being looked up here is fairly long and has odd characters in it. But probably the best sort of defensive technique here is to just eliminate lookups to unauthorized DNS servers, internal users should look up via an authorized recursive name server or forwarding name server that will then forward queries to both for example, a provider like Cloudflare or some filtering service like OpenDNS. And Google released a new version of Chrome on Friday. This version fixes one vulnerability, use after three vulnerability in cascading style sheets that is already being exploited in the wild or at least an exploit has been cited in the wild. So definitely keep Google Chrome updated as usual. Restart it once a day in at least once a week. Double check that you're running the latest version. And we have a good article by Sandro Gauji summarizing some of the issues with turn servers. And I don't really see people talk much about it. So that's why I add this as a reminder here. Estan, turn are both protocols meant to allow media streaming across NAT. Estan usually just helps you set up the connection, but then the connection works directly sort of end-to-end through NAT. Now if Estan doesn't work, then you can use turn, which also release the media traffic through a server that is reachable by both sites. The problem with this is that you're essentially introducing these proxies, these turn servers that can be used to more or less proxy a wide range of traffic and often sort of the inherent access control in these servers isn't all that great. They're really sort of focusing on making things work, which then often leads to abuse of these servers, in particular if they're hosted inside your infrastructure. So definitely something to be aware of and be cautious of that you are not really relaying here any traffic that you don't intend to relay. And yes, this is sort of a good sort of review of the different issues that can show up with turn. Well, and this is it for today. So thanks for listening, thanks for liking, and thanks for subscribing to this podcast. And as always, talk to you again tomorrow. Bye.





