Last Updated: 2008-07-10 07:52:34 UTC
by Swa Frantzen (Version: 5)
Overview of the July 2008 Microsoft patches and their status.
|#||Affected||Contra Indications||Known Exploits||Microsoft rating||ISC rating(*)|
|MS08-037||DNS spoofing and cache poisoning is made possible by a lack of entropy when doing DNS queries in both the DNS client and the DNS server. The lack of entropy is visible in the used source ports and the transaction IDs.|
UPDATE: Zonealarm press release (includes info on fix)
No publicly known exploits
|MS08-038||Multiple vulnerabilities in windows explorer allow code execution with the rights of the logged on user.|
CVE-2008-0951 is a well known vulnerability: CERT VU#889747 (march 2008).
Multiple XSS vulnerabilities in OWA (Outlook for Web Access) allow any action the authorized user could perform to be done without his consent.
|KB 953747||No publicly known exploits||Important||N/A||Critical(*)|
Multiple vulnerabilities in Microsoft's SQL server allow information disclosure and unauthorized complete control of the server.
||No publicly known exploits||Important||UPDATE: this does affect some clients
We appreciate updates
US based customers can call Microsoft for free patch related support on 1-866-PCSAFETY
- We use 4 levels:
- PATCH NOW: Typically used where we see immediate danger of exploitation. Typical environments will want to deploy these patches ASAP. Workarounds are typically not accepted by users or are not possible. This rating is often used when typical deployments make it vulnerable and exploits are being used or easy to obtain or make.
- Critical: Anything that needs little to become "interesting" for the dark side. Best approach is to test and deploy ASAP. Workarounds can give more time to test.
- Important: Things where more testing and other measures can help.
- Less Urgent: Typically we expect the impact if left unpatched to be not that big a deal in the short term. Do not forget them however.
- The difference between the client and server rating is based on how you use the affected machine. We take into account the typical client and server deployment in the usage of the machine and the common measures people typically have in place already. Measures we presume are simple best practices for servers such as not using outlook, MSIE, word etc. to do traditional office or leisure work.
- The rating is not a risk analysis as such. It is a rating of importance of the vulnerability and the perceived or even predicted threat for affected systems. The rating does not account for the number of affected systems there are. It is for an affected system in a typical worst-case role.
- Only the organization itself is in a position to do a full risk analysis involving the presence (or lack of) affected systems, the actually implemented measures, the impact on their operation and the value of the assets involved.
- All patches released by a vendor are important enough to have a close look if you use the affected systems. There is little incentive for vendors to publicize patches that do not have some form of risk to them.
(*): For exchange servers with active use of OWA
(**): For SQL servers with SQL users that are not trusted on the server itself, or situation where an escalation of problems needs to be avoided.
Swa Frantzen -- Section 66