Apple fixes vulnerabilities in iOS and iPadOS.
Apple today released iOS/iPadOS 17.0.3. These updates fix two vulnerabilities. A WebRTC vulnerability that could be used to execute arbitrary code, establishing initial access to the device, and a Kernel vulnerability used to elevate privileges. The privilege escalation vulnerability has been exploited against older versions of iOS. See Apple's page about these vulnerabilities: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213961.
| iOS 17.0.3 and iPadOS 17.0.3 |
|---|
| CVE-2023-42824 [critical] *** EXPLOITED *** Kernel The issue was addressed with improved checks. A local attacker may be able to elevate their privileges. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been actively exploited against versions of iOS before iOS 16.6. |
| x |
| CVE-2023-5217 [critical] WebRTC A buffer overflow may result in arbitrary code execution |
| x |
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Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. , Dean of Research, SANS.edu
Twitter|
What's Normal? Connection Sizes
Following up on the "What's Normal" diary from a couple of weeks ago, I have a new one: The size of connections. I am going to focus on the number of bytes being transmitted.
First of all, how to get the data. I am using my JSON formatted zeek logs again to extract the raw data (this may be easier with netflow data):
zcat conn.*gz | jq '. | select(.proto=="udp") | (.orig_ip_bytes+.resp_ip_bytes)' | sort | uniq -c > /tmp/udpsize.txt
zcat conn.*gz | jq '. | select(.proto=="tcp") | (.orig_ip_bytes+.resp_ip_bytes)' | sort | uniq -c > /tmp/tcpsize.txt
For additional analysis, I use the "datamash" tool, available via apt for Debian Linux or homebrew for macOS.
datamash count 1 mean 1 median 1 min 1 max 1 < tcpsize.txt
741776 81431.352935388 1275 0 829044805datamash count 1 mean 1 median 1 min 1 max 1 < udpsize.txt
1084957 10447.352885875 200 0 687501036
Making this a bit more readable as a table:
| Protocol | Count | Mean | Median | Max |
| TCP | 741,776 | 81,431 Bytes | 1275 Bytes | 829,044,805 |
| UDP | 1,084,957 | 10,447 Bytes | 200 Bytes | 687,501,036 |
Overall, this is what I expected. There are more (and shorter) UDP connections compared to TCP connections. Both do include extremely large connections with a couple hundred MBytes being transferred.
Let's visualize this quickly with gnuplot:
What is surprising is the large number of very short connections for TCP. This is confirmed by looking at the raw data:
126874 44
21604 60
8936 52
7840 260
7213 104
5854 449
There are many TCP connections with 44 or 60 bytes. This isn't surprising: Incomplete connections (portscans?). 40 bytes is an IP and TCP header with no option. 44 bytes gets us a single TCP option, like a maximum segment size (MSS).
So I probably should have eliminated them as anomalies.
Regarding the very large connections:
The TCP connection went to Wasabi, a cloud storage provider I use for backups. The UDP connection turned out to be a device using a VPN (as it should in this case). So nothing "bad", but two more things ruled out and explained :).
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Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. , Dean of Research, SANS.edu
Twitter|
Comments
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Dec 3rd 2022
10 months ago
Anonymous
Dec 3rd 2022
10 months ago
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Dec 26th 2022
9 months ago
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Dec 26th 2022
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Dec 26th 2022
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Dec 26th 2022
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Dec 26th 2022
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9 months ago
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Dec 26th 2022
9 months ago
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