Simple YARA Rules for Office Maldocs

Published: 2021-11-22
Last Updated: 2021-11-22 18:36:13 UTC
by Didier Stevens (Version: 1)
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In diary entry "Extra Tip For Triage Of MALWARE Bazaar's Daily Malware Batches" I shared 2 simple YARA rules to triage Office documents with VBA code.

This is rule olevba, for Office documents that use the binary CFBF aka ole file format:

rule olevba {
    strings:
        $attribut_e = {00 41 74 74 72 69 62 75 74 00 65}
    condition:
        uint32be(0) == 0xD0CF11E0 and $attribut_e
}

"uint32be(0) == 0xD0CF11E0" is a test to check if the file starts with D0CF11E0: that is the magic header of ole files.

The ASCII representation of 00 41 74 74 72 69 62 75 74 00 65 is ".Attribut.e", where the dot (.) represents a NULL byte. This sequence, is the start sequence of compressed VBA code generated by the VBA IDE (e.g., not been tampered with like VBA stomping).

If these 2 conditions are met, the YARA rule will trigger. False positives can occur, especially when string $attribut_e is found inside binary data that is not compressed VBA data.

This is rule pkvba, for Office documents that use the OOXML file format:

rule pkvba {
    strings:
        $vbaprojectbin = "vbaProject.bin"
    condition:
        uint32be(0) == 0x504B0304 and $vbaprojectbin
}

OOXML is essentially: a ZIP container, containing XML files.

"uint32be(0) == 0x504B0304" is a test to check if the file starts with 504B0304: that is the magic header of ZIP records typically found first inside a ZIP file.

vbaProject.bin is the filename of the ole file that contains the VBA project.

If these 2 conditions are met, the YARA rule will trigger. False positives can occur, especially when string vbaProject.bin is found somewhere else than inside a ZIP record.

 

Didier Stevens
Senior handler
Microsoft MVP
blog.DidierStevens.com

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