CSAM: ANY queries used in reflective DoS attack
Our reader Phillip sent in the following log excerpt:
15:53:34.329883 IP 80.82.64.114.44806 > 59.167.x.35.53: 9158+ [1au] ANY? hizbullah.me. (41) 15:53:34.331562 IP 80.82.64.114.44806 > 59.167.x.36.53: 9158+ [1au] ANY? hizbullah.me. (41) 15:53:34.331785 IP 80.82.64.114.44806 > 59.167.x.32.53: 9158+ [1au] ANY? hizbullah.me. (41) 15:53:34.332050 IP 80.82.64.114.44806 > 59.167.x.39.53: 9158+ [1au] ANY? hizbullah.me. (41) ... 15:58:56.288188 IP 122.136.196.116.34195 > 59.167.x.32.53: 17253+ [1au] A? 4fwhk.com. (50) 15:59:23.345810 IP 122.136.196.116.28558 > 59.167.x.34.53: 28322+ [1au] A? 4fwhk.com. (50) ...
There are a couple of indicators that these logs are "odd":
- ANY queries are unusual in normal DNS traffic. While they are valid, they are not often used in "normal" DNS traffic. But for DoS attacks, they provide large responses.
- the source port and the query ID doesn't change
- the speed of these queries is very fast.
The main "feature" of hizbullah.me becomes obvious if you look at the size of the response:
$ dig ANY hizbullah.me
;; Truncated, retrying in TCP mode.
; <<>> DiG 9.8.5-P1 <<>> ANY hizbullah.me
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 39771
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 244, AUTHORITY: 1, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;hizbullah.me. IN ANY
;; ANSWER SECTION:
hizbullah.me. 3589 IN SOA ns1.hizbullah.me. admin.hizbullah.me. 2012292301 28800 86400 3600000 86400
hizbullah.me. 1789 IN A 204.46.43.185
hizbullah.me. 1789 IN A 204.46.43.186
...
hizbullah.me. 1789 IN A 204.46.43.183
hizbullah.me. 1789 IN A 204.46.43.184
hizbullah.me. 1789 IN NS ns1.hizbullah.me.
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
hizbullah.me. 1789 IN NS ns1.hizbullah.me.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns1.hizbullah.me. 3588 IN A 200.241.86.132
;; Query time: 7 msec
;; SERVER: 10.5.0.86#53(10.5.0.86)
;; WHEN: Tue Oct 08 17:09:00 EDT 2013
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 3992
I removed most of the "A" record responses. There are a total of 243 if I counted right. The response is 3992 bytes, almost 100 times the size of the query (41 bytes). You also see at the top how dig indicates that it had to fall back to TCP because the response was too large. Many modern resolvers don't require this, and use EDNS0 to allow larger responses, typically up to 4kBytes in size.
The hizbullah.me domain appears to be set up just to act as a source of large DNS responses to be used in DoS attacks.
The second record no longer resolves. I can only assume that it was used similarly. The "ANY" query is not needed for a domain like hizbullah.me with many A records. Just an A query will result in a huge answer.
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Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D.
SANS Technology Institute
Twitter
Microsoft October 2013 Patch Tuesday
Overview of the October 2013 Microsoft patches and their status.
# | Affected | Contra Indications - KB | Known Exploits | Microsoft rating(**) | ISC rating(*) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
clients | servers | |||||
MS13-080 |
Cumulative Security Update for Internet Explorer (ReplacesMS13-069 ) |
|||||
Internet Explorer CVE-2013-3971 CVE-2013-3872 CVE-2013-3873 CVE-2013-3874 CVE-2013-3875 CVE-2013-3882 CVE-2013-3885 CVE-2013-3886 CVE-2013-3893 CVE-2013-3897 |
KB 2879017 | Yes. |
Severity:Critical Exploitability: 1 |
PATCH NOW! | Critical | |
MS13-081 |
Vulnerabilities in Windows Kernel-Mode Drivers Could Allow Remote Code Execution (ReplacesMS13-076 MS13-078 MS13-054 MS13-046 ) |
|||||
Kernel Mode Drivers (OpenType Font Parsing and others) CVE-2013-3128 CVE-2013-3200 CVE-2013-3879 CVE-2013-3880 CVE-2013-3881 CVE-2013-3888 CVE-2013-3894 |
KB 2870008 | No. |
Severity:Critical Exploitability: 1,2 |
Critical | Important | |
MS13-082 |
Vulnerabilities in .NET Framework Could Allow Remote Code Execution (ReplacesMS13-040 MS11-100 MS13-052 ) |
|||||
Microsoft .NET Framework (OpenType font) CVE-2013-3128 CVE-2013-3860 CVE-2013-3861 |
KB 2878890 | CVE-2013-3861 was publically disclosed. |
Severity:Critical Exploitability: 1,2,3 |
Critical | Importantl | |
MS13-083 |
Vulnerability in Windows Common Control Library Could Allow Remote Code Execution (ReplacesMS10-081 ) |
|||||
Windows Common Control Library (64 Bit versions only) DSA_InsertItem function used in webapps CVE-2013-3195 |
KB 2864058 | No. |
Severity:Critical Exploitability: 1 |
N/A | Critical | |
MS13-084 |
Vulnerabilities in Microsoft SharePoint Server Could Allow Remote Code Execution (ReplacesMS13-067 ) |
|||||
Sharepoint CVE-2013-3889 CVE-2013-3895 |
KB 2885089 | No. |
Severity:Important Exploitability: 3,2 |
N/A | Critical | |
MS13-085 |
Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Excel Could Allow Remote Code Execution (ReplacesMS13-072 MS13-072 ) |
|||||
Excel CVE-2013-3889 CVE-2013-3890 |
KB 2885080 | No. |
Severity:Important Exploitability: 1,2,3 |
Critical | Less Important | |
MS13-086 |
Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Word Could Allow Remote Code Execution (ReplacesMS13-072 ) |
|||||
Word CVE-2013-3891 CVE-2013-3892 |
KB 2885084 | No. |
Severity:Important Exploitability: 1,3 |
Critical | Less Important | |
MS13-087 |
Vulnerability in Silverlight Could Allow Information Disclosure (ReplacesMS13-052 ) |
|||||
Silverlight CVE-2013-3896 |
KB 2890788 | No. |
Severity:Important Exploitability: 3 |
Important | Less Important |
We appreciate updates
US based customers can call Microsoft for free patch related support on 1-866-PCSAFETY
-
We use 4 levels:
- PATCH NOW: Typically used where we see immediate danger of exploitation. Typical environments will want to deploy these patches ASAP. Workarounds are typically not accepted by users or are not possible. This rating is often used when typical deployments make it vulnerable and exploits are being used or easy to obtain or make.
- Critical: Anything that needs little to become "interesting" for the dark side. Best approach is to test and deploy ASAP. Workarounds can give more time to test.
- Important: Things where more testing and other measures can help.
- Less Urgent: Typically we expect the impact if left unpatched to be not that big a deal in the short term. Do not forget them however.
- The difference between the client and server rating is based on how you use the affected machine. We take into account the typical client and server deployment in the usage of the machine and the common measures people typically have in place already. Measures we presume are simple best practices for servers such as not using outlook, MSIE, word etc. to do traditional office or leisure work.
- The rating is not a risk analysis as such. It is a rating of importance of the vulnerability and the perceived or even predicted threat for affected systems. The rating does not account for the number of affected systems there are. It is for an affected system in a typical worst-case role.
- Only the organization itself is in a position to do a full risk analysis involving the presence (or lack of) affected systems, the actually implemented measures, the impact on their operation and the value of the assets involved.
- All patches released by a vendor are important enough to have a close look if you use the affected systems. There is little incentive for vendors to publicize patches that do not have some form of risk to them.
(**): The exploitability rating we show is the worst of them all due to the too large number of ratings Microsoft assigns to some of the patches.
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Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D.
SANS Technology Institute
Twitter
Anti-Virus Company Avira Homepage Defaced
Update
From Avira (http://techblog.avira.com/2013/10/08/major-dns-hijacking-affecting-major-websites-including-avira-com/en/)
"It appears that our account used to manage the DNS records registered at Network Solutions has received a fake password-reset request which was honored by the provider. Using the new credentials the cybercriminals have been able to change the entries to point to their DNS servers."-----------
The home page of anti virus company Avira has been defaced, likely by altering the DNS zone for Avira.com. Currently, avira.com uses the following NS records:
$ dig +short avira.com NS ns2.radioum.com.br. n1.ezmail.com.br. ns1.radioum.com.br. n2.ezmail.com.br.
$ dig +short A avira.com 173.193.136.42
Once an attacker has control of the NS records, they may also change MX records and redirect e-mail, or in the case of an Antivirus company like Avira change the addresses used to download signature updates.
According to domaintools.com, the last address for avira.com was 62.146.210.2 and that address still appears to host Avira's site.
NS1.AVIRA-NS.NET NS2.AVIRA-NS.DE 195.34.161.132 NS3.AVIRA-NS.NET NS4.AVIRA-NS.DE 212.7.178.67
Our reader Stuart sent us a screenshot with a similar defacement of Antivirus vendor AVG (avg.com), but the site appears to be back to normal now. I can't tell if that defacement was DNS related or not. Instant messaging software maker Whatsapp was appearently a third victim of this attack.
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Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D.
SANS Technology Institute
Twitter
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