Last Updated: 2011-04-05 18:52:01 UTC
by Johannes Ullrich (Version: 1)
A recent article  describes a rather neat variation on how fake router advertisements can be used with IPv6 capable hosts to intercept traffic, including tricking hosts to use IPv6 to connect to systems that normally are not reachable via IPv6.
First lets start with the "old" part of this attack: Fake router advertisements. IPv6 relies a lot more on auto configuration then IPv4. While techniques like "zero configuration" can be used in IPv4, we usually find DHCP used to configure IPv4 networks. In IPv6, routers are typically used to configure a network via "router advertisements". A router advertises which network it is willing to route, and hosts connected to the router will pick an address within this network.
In short, router advertisements can be considered a "DHCP lite" for IPv6. If I introduce a fake router, I get the same effect as I would get from a fake DHCP server in IPv4. However, as only few networks implement IPv6, a fake IPv6 router is likely to be the only IPv6 router. Hosts which so far had no connectivity to the IPv6 internet will now use this fake router to connect. Fake router advertisement tools are very common, we actually play with one in my IPv6 class (fake_router6 from the THC kit)
Big deal. There are not a lot of IPv6 sites. So why should I care? The reason you may need to care is a protocol called "NAT-PT". NAT-PT is an experimental protocol used to connect IPv6 only networks to the legacy IPv4 network. NAT-PT works by returning IPv6 addresses for DNS lookups that would otherwise only return IPv4 addresses. Once a host connects to this "mapped" IPv6 address, the NAT-PT router will translate the IPv6 connection to an IPv4 connection, much like we are used to from IPv4-to-IPv4 NAT.
By combining the fake RA advertisements with NAT-PT, the attacker has the ability to intercept traffic that would normally use IPv4. To make things more interesting, if a host has IPv6 and IPv4 connectivity, the IPv6 connection is preferred, causing this attack to work even better.
What are the work arounds? How do you defend?
- IPv6 is a wonderful protocol. But if you don't need it: Turn it off. If you need it, then monitor and defend it like IPv4
- the attack does require layer 2 access. Physical access to your network should be restricted
- if you use an "open" network (e.g. public wifi), use encryption to protect yourself (SSL, IPSec). This attack is not more deadly in this case then other layer 2 attacks.
And also see our IPv6 Security Summit in July
Last Updated: 2011-04-05 06:37:33 UTC
by Mark Hofman (Version: 1)
Another DDOS slipped by almost unnoticed (thanks Arnt). A report in Datanews (http://datanews.rnews.be/nl/ict/nieuws/nieuwsoverzicht/2011/04/04/botnet-viseert-belgie/article-1194984299269.htm# in Dutch) mentions that the .be domain was under attack last Sunday. Requests were being made of the servers relating to MX records for other domains. The .be name servers do not look after this information and correctly responded. However the end result was that two out of the 8 servers were overloaded. Even should the other servers be overloaded the TLD is anycast hosted and another 41 or so servers could jump into action. Hence the attack went largely unnoticed by the public.
Last Updated: 2011-04-05 06:17:53 UTC
by Mark Hofman (Version: 1)
The Anonymous group is currently utilising LOIC to DDOS Sony infrastructure. It seems that it is partially successful with a few Sony sites being unavailable at the moment.