September microsoft patch overview

Published: 2007-09-11
Last Updated: 2007-09-14 12:27:52 UTC
by Swa Frantzen (Version: 4)
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Overview of the September 2007 Microsoft patches and their status.

# Affected Contra Indications Known Exploits Microsoft rating ISC rating(*)
clients servers
MS07-051 An input validation failure allows remote code execution via crafted URLs with the rights of the logged on user.
Replaces MS07-020
Agent (Windows 2000)

KB 938827
Exploit available in for pay program since sept. 12th Critical Critical Important
MS07-052 Input validation failure leads to a buffer overflow that allows remote code execution via a crafted "RPT" file with the rights of the logged on user.
Crystal reports redistributed with visual studio

KB 941522

Issues with repeated installation offers have been reported.
MSRC blog
Well known vulnerability with public exploit code Important Important (**) (***) Less Urgent (**) (***)
MS07-053 suid binaries allow escalation of privileges
Windows services for UNIX


KB 939778

No publicly known exploits Important Less Urgent (**) Important (**)
MS07-054 Unspecified failure allows remote code execution with the rights of the logged on user

KB 942099

MSRC blog
Details of how to exploit are public Important Critical Important


We will update issues on this page as they evolve.
We appreciate updates
US based customers can call Microsoft for free patch related support on 1-866-PCSAFETY
(*): ISC rating
  • We use 4 levels:
    • PATCH NOW: Typically used where we see immediate danger of exploitation. Typical environments will want to deploy these patches ASAP. Workarounds are typically not accepted by users or are not possible. This rating is often used when typical deployments make it vulnerable and exploits are being used or easy to obtain or make.
    • Critical: Anything that needs little to become "interesting" for the dark side. Best approach is to test and deploy ASAP. Workarounds can give more time to test.
    • Important: Things where more testing and other measures can help.
    • Less Urgent: Typically we expect the impact if left unpatched to be not that big a deal in the short term. Do not forget them however.
  • The difference between the client and server rating is based on how you use the affected machine. We take into account the typical client and server deployment in the usage of the machine and the common measures people typically have in place already. Measures we presume are simple best practices for servers such as not using outlook, MSIE, word etc. to do traditional office or leisure work.
  • The rating is not a risk analysis as such. It is a rating of importance of the vulnerability and the perceived or even predicted threat for affected systems. The rating does not account for the number of affected systems there are. It is for an affected system in a typical worst-case role.
  • Only the organization itself is in a position to do a full risk analysis involving the presence (or lack of) affected systems, the actually implemented measures, the impact on their operation and the value of the assets involved.
  • All patches released by a vendor are important enough to have a close look if you use the affected systems. There is little incentive for vendors to publicize patches that do not have some form of risk to them.

(**): If installed.

(***): This rating is provided the RPT files have not been associated with Crystal Reports, which is the default.

Swa Frantzen -- NET2S

Keywords: mspatchday
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TOR - sniffing exit nodes

Published: 2007-09-11
Last Updated: 2007-09-11 12:51:18 UTC
by Swa Frantzen (Version: 1)
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The (IT) press is buzzing somewhat with attacks against the onion router (TOR).
The problem is lies in an atack performed and used to gain access to mailboxes by creating and sniffing the unencrypted side of some Tor exit nodes.

From a technical perspective these attacks are known and documented in e.g. the Tor FAQ:

Tor -tries to- provide anonymity. Anonymity and security are two different beasts. When passing unencrypted traffic (such as POP3, IMAP etc) you are basically not only handing the malicious Tor exit node the contents of your email, but also -in many cases- the keys (login and password) to your mailbox.

Swa Frantzen -- NET2S

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