Honeypot Mirroring .edu domains under .eu / Active Threat
The .eu top-level domain is relatively new and in the build-up phase and had a co-worker notice something fun.
When ssh'ing to a local server, he typo'd and finished the DNS name as .eu, it connected with an SSH handshake (it was a new server so the key warning wasn't considered a big deal) and took a password. The individual immediately recognized the problem when the password wasn't accepted and we investigated.
It appears any DNS name at ourdomain.eu would resolve to this machine. Not only that, but the machine in question was hosting at least 7 other domains under .eu that would map to an educational institution. For instance, for "fake" educational institution at ufoo.edu you could search for ufoo.eu and get a response to this machine.
nslookup www.ufoo.edu
response: 111.222.111.222 (good)
nslookup www.ufoo.eu
response: 200.100.200.100 (bad)
nslookup XXX.ufoo.eu (XXX = anything whether or not it exists on the .edu side)
response: 200.100.200.100 (bad)
It appears that this machine will take anything from certain domains and resolve it, whether or not the dnsname actually exists on your end. (i.e. wildcard)
What is appears, for the moment, is that this machine is running a honeypot to capture passwords for people who typo .edu as .eu. However, with a little ingenuity they could turn this enterprise into something truly evil. Right now it is only running a few token services and the webpage appears to be hosting "non-content". There are some who think this is "legit".
With this main .edu's pointing to the same place to a box with non-content, I'm not buying it. Incidents like this are a good reason to be cautious, particularly when the mitigation is as non-involved as it is.
Mitigation:
Check your .edu to see if it resolves as an .eu (i.e. nslookup www.yourdomain.eu and see what happens).
If you get 212.79.243.140, they are mirroring your .edu.
Filter that IP in both directions and pursue what other avenues your lawyers think necessary (i.e. lock down the .eu equivalent of your domain).
I'm interested in how wide-spread this is, and would like a report if your .edu is affected.
----
John Bambenek
bambenek /at/ gmail [dot] com
When ssh'ing to a local server, he typo'd and finished the DNS name as .eu, it connected with an SSH handshake (it was a new server so the key warning wasn't considered a big deal) and took a password. The individual immediately recognized the problem when the password wasn't accepted and we investigated.
It appears any DNS name at ourdomain.eu would resolve to this machine. Not only that, but the machine in question was hosting at least 7 other domains under .eu that would map to an educational institution. For instance, for "fake" educational institution at ufoo.edu you could search for ufoo.eu and get a response to this machine.
nslookup www.ufoo.edu
response: 111.222.111.222 (good)
nslookup www.ufoo.eu
response: 200.100.200.100 (bad)
nslookup XXX.ufoo.eu (XXX = anything whether or not it exists on the .edu side)
response: 200.100.200.100 (bad)
It appears that this machine will take anything from certain domains and resolve it, whether or not the dnsname actually exists on your end. (i.e. wildcard)
What is appears, for the moment, is that this machine is running a honeypot to capture passwords for people who typo .edu as .eu. However, with a little ingenuity they could turn this enterprise into something truly evil. Right now it is only running a few token services and the webpage appears to be hosting "non-content". There are some who think this is "legit".
With this main .edu's pointing to the same place to a box with non-content, I'm not buying it. Incidents like this are a good reason to be cautious, particularly when the mitigation is as non-involved as it is.
Mitigation:
Check your .edu to see if it resolves as an .eu (i.e. nslookup www.yourdomain.eu and see what happens).
If you get 212.79.243.140, they are mirroring your .edu.
Filter that IP in both directions and pursue what other avenues your lawyers think necessary (i.e. lock down the .eu equivalent of your domain).
I'm interested in how wide-spread this is, and would like a report if your .edu is affected.
----
John Bambenek
bambenek /at/ gmail [dot] com
Keywords:
0 comment(s)
Bot C&C Servers on Port 80
We do see more and more bots that use port 80 for their C&C channel. This will make these bots harder to detect. However, these are IRC servers, so its not that hard to distinguish them from HTTP traffic.
Couple tricks that may help:
Couple tricks that may help:
- Implement a proxy server to filter outbound port 80 traffic. This is a good idea anyway as it may help you to implement additional filtering for web traffic as well.
- If you suspect an IRC server on port 80 in your own network, a quick scan with nmap (version 4 and later) can help:
nmap -A -p 80 10.0.0.0/24 (The '-A' option will look for service banners)
Interesting ports on 10.0.0.a:
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
80/tcp open tcpwrapped <--- expect this from devices
using web admin interfaces.
Interesting ports on 10.0.0.b:
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
80/tcp open http? <--- this server is running apache
with customized headers.
Interesting ports on 10.0.0.c:
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
80/tcp open irc ircu ircd <--- this server is running IRC!
Service Info: Host: megaserver
- implement a snort rule to look for IRC traffic on port 80. Snorts 'chat.rules' has a number of rules to detect IRC, but they are limited to port 6666:7000 by default. Make sure you get the latest version. You need to use the "registration required but free" rules.
If you don't want to deal with the legal issues of Sourcefire's "VRT" rules, use the Bleedingthreats rules: IRC Policy Rules, Trojan/Bot IRC rules.
Keywords:
0 comment(s)
Microsoft Black Tuesday Overview
Overview of the November 2006 Microsoft patches and their status.
# | Affected | Contra Indications | Known Exploits | Microsoft rating | ISC rating(*) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
clients | servers | |||||
MS06-066 | Netware client services - remote code execution & DoS CVE-2006-4688 CVE-2006-4689 |
No known problems KB 923980 |
PoC exploits available in for pay program |
Important | Less Urgent | Less Urgent |
MS06-067 | Internet Explorer - remote code execution CVE-2006-4446 CVE-2006-4777 CVE-2006-4687 |
No known problems KB 922760 |
Actively exploited on websites in the wild websense |
Critical | PATCH NOW | Important |
MS06-068 | Microsoft Agent - remote code execution CVE-2006-3445 |
No known problems KB 920213 |
No known exploits |
Critical | Critical | Less Urgent |
MS06-069 | Adobe flash player - remote code execution CVE-2006-3014 CVE-2006-3311 CVE-2006-3587 CVE-2006-3588 CVE-2006-4640 |
No known problems KB 923789 |
No known exploits |
Critical | Critical | Less Urgent |
MS06-070 | Workstation service - remote code execution CVE-2006-4691 |
No known problems KB 924270 |
Vulnerability details are public ; Exploit publicly available |
Critical |
Critical (**) |
Critical (**) |
MS06-071 | XML Core services CVE-2006-5745 |
No known problems KB 928088 also: KB 927977 KB 927978 |
Exploits publicly available |
Critical | PATCH NOW | Important |
We will update issues on this page as they evolve.
We appreciate updates
US based customers can call Microsoft for free patch related support on 1-866-PCSAFETY
We appreciate updates
US based customers can call Microsoft for free patch related support on 1-866-PCSAFETY
(*): ISC rating
- We use 4 levels:
- PATCH NOW: Typically used where we see immediate danger of exploitation. Typical environments will want to deploy these patches ASAP. Workarounds are typically not accepted by users or are not possible. This rating is often used when typical deployments make it vulnerable and exploits are being used or easy to obtain or make.
- Critical: Anything that needs little to become "interesting" for the dark side. Best approach is to test and deploy ASAP. Workarounds can give more time to test.
- Important: Things where more testing and other measures can help.
- Less urgent: Typically we expect the impact if left unpatched to be not that big a deal in the short term. Do not forget them however.
- The difference between the client and server rating is based on how you use the affected machine. We take into account the typical client and server deployment in the usage of the machine and the common measures people typically have in place already. Measures we presume are simple best practices for servers such as not using outlook, MSIE, word etc. to do traditional office or leisure work.
- The rating is not a risk analysis as such. It is a rating of importance of the vulnerability and the perceived or even predicted threat for affected systems. The rating does not account for the number of affected systems there are. It is for an affected system in a typical worst-case role.
- Only the organization itself is in a position to do a full risk analysis involving the presence (or lack of) affected systems, the actually implemented measures, the impact on their operation and the value of the assets involved.
- All patches released by a vendor are important enough to have a close look if you use the affected systems. There is little incentive for vendors to publicize patches that do not have some form of risk to them.
--
Swa Frantzen -- Section 66
Keywords: mspatchday
0 comment(s)
Microsoft patch troubles ?
Reboot wednesday passed with just a few isolated reports of trouble with the patches.
We would like to remind our readers we are interested in problems with patches. It's one of those cases where a community sharing such information as soon as possible can really work wonders.
However:
Swa Frantzen -- Section 66
We would like to remind our readers we are interested in problems with patches. It's one of those cases where a community sharing such information as soon as possible can really work wonders.
However:
- Do not forget to report such trouble back to Microsoft as well, it's the best way to get them to do something about it, and that kind of support is free.
In the US call 1-866-PCSAFETY.
Other coutries need to look it up on the Microsoft website, but it should be free just as well. [Fill in the country and then look in the column to the right] - Do not wait for others to go first. We're all interested in not being the first ones to hit the bump in the road. Unfortunately this results in increasingly longer periods of just waiting and being exposed to the bad guys. Those bad guys are not waisting a second in getting their exploits out there, either actively using it, either selling the exploit itself.
Swa Frantzen -- Section 66
Keywords:
0 comment(s)
×
Diary Archives
Comments