Opera Fix/Safari Work-around for Window Injection Vuln, APB: UDP Fragment Data, Reading Room

Published: 2004-12-11
Last Updated: 2004-12-12 04:17:18 UTC
by Dave Brookshire (Version: 1)
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Opera Fix for Window Injection Vuln, Safari Work-around

Reader Laurent sent in a note that Opera has released a fix for the Window Injection Vulnerability mentioned in yesterday's diary. Get the fix here:

http://www.opera.com/support/search/supsearch.dml?index=782

Also, according to another message received by Lenny, Safari 1.2.4 (v125.12) on OS-X 10.3.6, is NOT vulnerable to the exploit if the pop-up blocker is enabled. It IS vulnerable if the pop-up blocker is disabled.

Refer to yesterday's diary for more information and tests.

http://isc.sans.org/diary.php?date=2004-12-10

Continued request for Specific UDP Fragment Data

Quoting from Lenny's Diary Yesterday:

My fellow handlers are in the process of analyzing the odd UDP packets that we've discussed in the past few diaries. Thank you to everyone who has shared their traces with us. We hope to provide you with a comprehensive analysis as soon as we correlate and analyze the data we've collected.

We have enough generic data for now; however, we would like to take a closer look at certain types of packets. If you have seen UDP fragments with the TTL value of 57 or higher that came from the 83.102.166.0 network, please send us your trace. If sending the packets to us, please indicate the name of your upstream provider, if you can. Also, please tell us whether it's OK for us to share the IP addresses that you saw and the TTL values with a group of ISP security professionals.

You can capture such UDP "interesting" traffic using the following Tcpdump filter:

src net 83.102.166 and \
(ip[6] & 0x02 = 0 and ip[6:2] & 0x1fff !=0) and \
((ip[8] > 56) or (ip[2:2] != 45))

You can capture such UDP "interesting" traffic using the following Snort signatures:

alert ip 83.102.166.0/24 any -> any any \
(msg: "ISC Handlers - UDP Frag Hunt - Narrowing TTL"; \
byte_test: 2,=,45,2; \ # len = 45
byte_test: 2,=,64,6; \ # fake frag
byte_test: 1,>,56,8; \ # ttl higher than 56
content: "|11EF 0035 0019 50D7 71F7 0100 0001 0000 0000 0000 0000 0200 01|";) # DNS root NS query

alert ip 83.102.166.0/24 any -> any any \
(msg: "ISC Handlers - UDP Frag Hunt - Bigger Packets"; \
byte_test: 2,>,45,2; \ # len > 45
byte_test: 2,=,64,6; \ # fake frag
content: "|11EF 0035 0019 50D7 71F7 0100 0001 0000 0000 0000 0000 0200 01|";) # DNS root NS query

Thanks to handler Erik Fichtner for putting these signatures together.

Reading Room

It's been a very pleasant (read: quiet) Saturday. So for your reading enjoyment, here are a few links that I found interesting today from a couple of different places:

Slashdot: Penn State Tells Students To Ditch IE
http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/12/11/2035222&tid=172&tid=113&tid=146&tid=220&tid=218

Security Focus: Detecting Complex Viruses

http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1813

SANS Reading Room: Dead Linux Machines Do Tell Tales, by James Fung

http://www.sans.org/rr/whitepapers/honors/1491.php (724K)

Good night, and have a pleasant tomorrow!

-db

Dave Brookshire
Handler-on-Duty

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